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Introduction  
The legal framework of democracies grants citizens the right to assemble and protest against 
state policies. Here democracy refers to “a political system, which supplies regular 
constitutional opportunities for changing the governing officials.”1 Citizens of this political 
system have a higher chance to influence state policies compared to citizens of authoritarian 
states and illiberal or semi-democracies.2 Authoritarian states, in contrast to democracies, do 
not have the obligation to regularly renew its political leadership. Muller & Seligson argue 
that governments of authoritarian states often violently suppress oppositional forces and that 
makes the costs of citizens to participate in anti-governmental protests high.3 Moreover, 
citizens living in authoritarian states have a low perception for the chance of launching a 
successful protest. Muller & Seligson argue that due to the high costs of action and the low 
perceived chance of success, uprisings are unlikely to emerge in authoritarian states.4 
In recent years, we have seen uprisings in democracies and authoritarian states. 
Examples include the Occupy Movement in various parts of the United States of America 
(USA) and Europe; the demonstrations held in Gezi Park in Istanbul, Turkey; and protests in 
Greece against economic policies of the European Union (EU). Further, large-scale revolts 
took place in several states: pro-Russian forces clashed with pro-European actors in Crimea 
and other places in Ukraine; a year after the death of Hugo Chavez, students and government 
forces clashed with each other in Venezuela; and in May 2014, the Thai population protested 
against its corrupted political leader resulting in a coup d’état by the Thai army. Given the 
destabilizing effect on both the domestic and international realm and the unpredictability of 
these events, it is increasingly important to investigate when and how uprisings affect regime 
stability.  
Central in this thesis will be the political consequences of the Arab Spring for the 
political regimes of Egypt and Algeria in the period of 2010-2012. The Arab Spring refers to 
uprisings that took place in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) varying in intensity 
from 2010 onwards. The Arab Spring led to regime change in several cases (i.e., Tunisia, 
Egypt, Libya and Yemen), but most regimes in the region endured (i.e., Algeria, Jordan, 
Morocco, Bahrain, Syria, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Lipset 1959, p.71 
2 For a classification of political systems, see: Croissant & Merkel 2004. 
3 Muller & Seligson, 1987 
4 Muller & Seligson 1987 
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Emirates). Among academics, there is no consensus on the exact date of the start of the Arab 
Spring. Some scholars argue that the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi, a Tunisian 
market vendor, marks the beginning of the Arab Spring, while others argue that the Arab 
Spring commenced when the Tunisian uprisings spilled over into Egypt and other states in the 
MENA. The consequences of the Arab Spring are still unfolding, while writing this thesis. 
What we do know, according to Hale, is that The Arab Spring occurred “rapidly” and “in 
apparent chain reaction,” and that the events are of great importance to “how people live” in 
the region.5  
This thesis investigates how uprisings in Egypt and Algeria in the period of 2010-2012 
affected the stability of the respective regimes. The research question is: “Why did uprisings 
lead to regime change in Egypt, but not in Algeria?” For the purpose of this thesis, I will use 
the protests within Tunisia in late 2010 and early 2011 as a reaction to the self-immolation by 
Mohamed Bouazizi as the starting point of the Arab Spring. One explanation for the 
transnational spread of uprisings and its effects on regime survival can be found in the theory 
of modular diffusion. Amongst others, this concept was used to study the “colored 
revolutions” (i.e., a sequence of mass demonstrations that took place in Eastern Europe in the 
2000s) and in that context it has been extensively debated by academics. Less scholarly 
attention has been given, however, to the interconnectedness of the recent uprisings in the 
MENA. Other explanations for the emergence of uprisings are focus only on the structural 
factors within a state. I contribute to this academic debate by examining the merits of these 
existing explanations on new cases. I aim to find new insights in the interaction between 
structural factors and mechanisms of modular diffusion. Moreover, this thesis could increase 
our understanding of how Egypt and Algeria experienced the Arab Spring. The findings of 
this research could to some extent apply to other authoritarian regimes.  
The nature of uprisings in Algeria and Egypt had major consequences for their 
incumbent ruling powers: Hosni Mubarak, the president of Egypt was ousted, but Abdelaziz 
Bouteflika, the president of Algeria managed to hold on to power. The Arab Spring caught the 
attention of the international community. Policymakers and academics alike were concerned 
about the consequences of regime-change in the MENA. Israel for example feared that the 
removal of president Mubarak would lead to the emergence of anti-Israel sentiments within 
Egypt.6  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Hale 2013, p.333 
6 Dalacoura 2012, p.77 
7	  
	  
	  
So far, academics have neglected failed uprisings, resulting in lack of variation on the 
outcome. I account for this fact by investigating both a successful uprising and a failed 
uprising. Some academics argue that only differences between cases in terms of structural 
factors account for the nature and the effects of an uprising. I believe that such an explanation 
fails to capture the whole story. An explanation based on structural factors that incorporates 
mechanisms of modular diffusion could lead to a higher explanatory value.7 Therefore, I 
argue that the events of the Arab Spring can be understood the best by examining the 
interplay between mechanisms of modular diffusion and structural factors. Thus, I argue that 
using a theory that combines structural factors and diffusion mechanisms could lead to a 
higher explanatory value in the cases of the Arab Spring. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 One example of such an explanation can be found in Mark R. Beissinger’s “Structure and Example in Modular 
Political Phenomena: The Diffusion of Bulldozer/Rose/Orange/Tulip Revolutions” (2007).  
	  
	  
Literature review 
Here I will provide an analysis of contemporary studies on uprisings within authoritarian 
states and their relevance for regime stability. In the second part of the literature review, I will 
present and analyze existing literature that seeks to explain regime stability of Arab regimes 
in the wake of uprisings. The purpose of this chapter is to evaluate the usability of various 
explanations for the emergence of uprisings and their effect on regime stability. This analysis 
enables me to construct a theoretical framework that can be used to research the Arab 
uprisings.  
Defining uprisings 
Merriam-Webster defines an uprising as: “a usually violent effort by many people to change 
the government or leader of a country.”8 Oxford Dictionaries offers a shorter and slightly 
different definition: “An act of resistance or rebellion; a revolt.”9 I argue that both definitions 
underscore the violent character of an uprising, because rebellion and revolt imply armed 
resistance. In this work I will use the following definition (by Brownlee et al.) for the concept 
of uprising: “a major type of contentious collective action marked by 1) the eruption of 
nonviolent mass protest over multiple days, 2) the spread of that protest across multiple 
geographical locations, and 3) the control by protesters of public places…”10  
Brownlee et al. argue that uprisings are nonviolent by nature.11 They differ from 
normal demonstrations “in their size, national resonance, and persistence” and they cannot be 
equated with armed insurgencies, according to Brownlee et al. In this thesis I will treat 
uprisings as non-violent acts of resistance by citizens against their respective governments. At 
times, however, (non-violent) uprisings and armed insurgencies coincided during the Arab 
Spring. 
How do uprisings emerge and how do they affect regime stability? 
Here I will analyze current debates and controversies with regard to the emergence of civil 
uprisings. Explanations for the emergence of civil uprisings can be grouped (roughly) into 
two groups. In the first group of explanations, differences between states in terms of structural 
factors are the key cause for the emergence and outcome of uprisings. The second group of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Merriam-Webster. “Uprising.”  
9 Oxford Dictionaries. “Uprising.”  
10 Brownlee, Masoud & Reynolds 2013, p.35 
11 Brownlee, Masoud & Reynolds 2013, p.35 
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explanations seeks to explain the causes and consequences of uprisings by focusing on 
diffusion mechanisms.  
 
Explanations based on structural factors 
Explanations for the stability of authoritarian regimes based on structural factors focus on the 
presence of certain attributes within an authoritarian state that either empowers or weakens 
the regime and the opposition. The underlying logic is that a strong authoritarian regime has 
the means to prevent the outbreak of civil uprisings and if uprisings do emerge, it has to 
means to crackdown on dissent.  
Now I will analyze structural factors that empower authoritarian states to survive in 
the wake of - or prevent the emergence of - uprisings. Way argues that the capabilities of 
authoritarian states to “defuse, coopt, or crush” uprisings are determined by “the presence of a 
single, highly institutionalized ruling party; an extensive and well-funded coercive apparatus 
that has won a major violent conflict; or state discretionary control over the economy.”12 Way 
specifies that parties organized on the basis of a strong ideology are more likely to survive, 
compared to parties that lack tradition or ideology.13  
In order for autocrats to stay in power, they establish and maintain patronage networks 
while cutting off dissidents financially, according to Way.14 Because this tactic is costly, Way 
argues that only regimes that have full control over the economy or those that rely on 
revenues gained by the export of natural resources are able to pursue this tactic. Radnitz 
agrees that regimes with a strong control over the economy are less likely to witness uprisings, 
compared to states with a more liberalized economy. Radnitz argues that state-control over 
the economy undermines dissent, while the loss of power over the economy by an autocrat 
fosters elite defection.15  
Williamson & Abadeer argue that the loyalty of the military to its regime affects 
regime vulnerability to uprisings. Authoritarian regimes are likely to face the emergence of 
uprisings when the business sector supports the opposition, says Radnitz.16 Further, autocrats 
that maintain strong ties to the West are less likely to consolidate their power compared to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Way 2008, p.62 
13 Way 2008 
14 Way 2008, p.64  
15 Radnitz 2010 
16 Radnitz 2010, p.134 
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those regimes that have weaker ties to the West. Way says this is the case because 
authoritarian states are sensitive to Western pressure.17  
 
Explanations centered on political diffusion 
Academics such as Bunce and Wolchik argue that uprisings could be diffused across borders 
and as such they study uprisings as interconnected phenomena. Bunce & Wolchik define 
diffusion as “a process wherein new ideas, institutions, policies, models or repertoires of 
behavior spread geographically from a core site to new sites.”18 Today’s interconnectedness 
allows citizens and governments to monitor what is happening elsewhere in the world. Events 
that take place in one case could influence another case: known as cross-case influence or 
Galton’s problem.  
Political diffusion comes in many shapes and sizes (e.g., hierarchical; proximal; direct; 
and indirect); yet they all describe the following phenomenon: the sharing of an innovation 
(i.e., tactics, resources and information) between a transmitter and an adopter through a 
certain channel. 19  Campana and Ratelle argue that diffusion refers not to “a simple 
transposition of practices” but it “entails the adaption of a set of practices/and or discourses 
into a new context.”20 Variation on the presence and nature of diffusion mechanisms explain 
why uprisings appear in some cases, but not in other cases.  
Regime stability of Arab regimes 
The following structural factors affect the stability of Arab regimes in the wake of uprisings, I 
will elaborate on the relation between each of these structural factors and regime stability. It is 
fair to say that some structural factors might be interrelated. States that possess natural 
resources (e.g., oil and gas), for example, often have larger budgets for military spending 
compared to states that lack income derived from the export of natural resources. 
 
Hereditary tradition 
Monarchies and other regimes based on hereditary tradition have a lowered probability to 
experience the outbreak of uprisings and in the case of protests do occur they proof to be less 
of a threat to them compared to rulers in non-hereditary regimes, say Brownlee et al.21 In the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Way 2008 
18 Bunce & Wolchik, 2007, p.93. 
19 Soule 2004, p.295 
20 Campana and Ratelle 2014, p.118-119 
21 Brownlee, Masoud & Reynolds 2013, p.35 
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context of monarchies, the rationale is that uprisings are “more manageable and pose less of a 
threat to the regime” because their institutional arrangements allow the incumbent ruler to be 
flexible in terms of reform, say Williamson & Abadeer.  Goldstone argues for example that 
monarchs can hold on to power by “ceding legislative power to elected parliaments.”  
 The cases of Morocco and Jordan illuminate the strong standing of monarchs in the 
wake of uprisings, say Williamson & Abadeer, “[in Morocco and Jordan] protests movements 
never developed coherent-enough demands to threaten the regime, and were quickly diffused 
by the monarch’s offers of reforms, which were often never fully realized.”22 Some of the 
monarchs of Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Jordan and Morocco used income derived 
from oil money to “prevent or quell” unrest in their territory in the wake of the Tunisian and 
Egyptian uprisings, says Gelvin.23 Apart from providing their citizens economic relief, Arab 
monarchies reacted to uprisings with violence, according to Gelvin.24 Co-optation took place 
in Morocco. The Moroccan king designated a committee to address the demands of the 
February 20 Movement, a leading force behind the Moroccan protests of 2011-2012, and 
change the constitution. The demonstrators had only limited success, because the newly 
adopted constitution had no meaningful changes.25 
 
The possession of oil or other natural resources 
Arab states that rely on oil export have had large budgets when oil prices were high to weaken 
opposition by “distributing resources through increased state salaries, higher subsidies for 
consumer goods, new state jobs, and direct handouts to citizens”, according to Gause.26 Non-
oil-producing states, such as Egypt and Tunisia, needed to modernize their economies and this 
led to larger inequalities in the respective societies, according to Gause. Williamson & 
Abadeer provide empirical evidence for the oil-argument.27  
 Of the eight “oil-wealthy regimes” (i.e., Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, 
Algeria, Libya and United Arab Emirates) only two (namely: Bahrain and Libya) faced 
uprisings, while half (namely: Egypt, Tunisia, Syria and Yemen) of the eight “oil-poor 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Williamson & Abadeer 2014 
23 Both Jordan and Morocco “made economic concessions to protesters”, such as restoring subsidies and 
lowering prices. Saudi Arabia promised its citizens a waiver of measures worth “130$ billion”, consisting of 
“sixty thousand new government jobs”, higher minimum wages in the public sector, giving bonuses to state 
employees, building half a million new housing units, and lowering the personal debt of citizens. The Bahraini 
monarchy reacted to domestic protests by promising $2,650 to every household. See: Gelvin 2012, p.126-135. 
24 Gelvin 2012, p.133 
25 Gelvin 2012, p.135 
26 Gause 2011, p.3 
27 Williamson & Abadeer 2014 
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regimes” (i.e., Jordan, Morocco, Egypt, Mauritania, Tunisia, Syria, Yemen and Sudan) had 
major uprisings. These numbers show that regimes with vast financial budgets derived from 
oil export make effective use of their wealth by silencing the opposition and preventing the 
outbreak of uprisings. 
I argue that some demonstrators were not motivated by money and they cared deeply 
about human right violations by their regime. Thus, the role of money should not be 
overestimated since other causes than economic grievances made citizens willing to contest 
their respective rulers.  
 
Personal leadership 
The reputation of an incumbent Arab ruler and his goodwill with his nation affects the 
respective regime stability, says Gelvin.28 A favorable condition for the ruler is to have a 
“reputation as a reformer”. One way to create goodwill is to take a tough stance against the 
United States of America (USA) and Israel.  
 
Role of the security apparatus 
A history of violent repression of a nation by a regime’s security apparatus makes a regime 
more stable, says Gelvin.29 The legacy of repression reminds citizens to obey the regime. 
Williamson & Abadeer argue that Arab autocrats could only stay in power in the wake of 
uprisings if they made effective use of their capability to “implement a crackdown that will 
scatter the opposition and help reassert its control over the state.” 
The roles Arab armies played during the uprisings were caused by unique, country 
specific factors, says Barany.30 Williamson & Abadeer, however, dare to generalize if an 
army will loyal to its regime or not. The actions of an army are determined by its composition 
in terms of institutionalization versus kinship, say Williamson & Abadeer. Gregory Gause 
also asserts that a regime’s survival depends on its relationship with the army. Gause 
distinguishes between “relatively professional”, armies that are institutionalized and do not 
function as the “personal instrument of the ruler”; “less institutionalized forces” tied to the 
ruling elite; and armies concentrated around an “ethnic, sectarian, or regional minority.” 31 In 
recent history, armies belonging to the first category (as in Tunisia and Egypt) have backed 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Gelvin 2012, p.101-103 
29 Gelvin 2012, p.101-103 
30 Barany 2011 
31 Gause 2011, p.2 
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demonstrators. Libya and Yemen have “less institutionalized” armies and these “have split or 
dissolved” during the recent uprisings. So far, armies that are linked to a minority, as in 
Bahrain, Jordan and Saudi Arabia, have stood their ground. From this logic we can conclude 
that states in which a minority group dominates the armed forces are more likely to prolong 
compared to states that have a military comprised of the majority group. 
Bellin researched the strength of the coercive apparatus of authoritarian states and she 
pointed out four determinants for its robustness: finances; international support; degree of 
institutionalization; and the degree of political mobilization.32 A coercive apparatus that 
receives a lot of income; has international backing from other states; is based on 
patrimonialism; and faces weak mobilization, is likely to stay loyal to the regime. Variations 
in these four factors could lead to defection of individuals from the security apparatus. Bellin 
argues that both Egypt and Algeria received financial support from the West because of 
security concerns (i.e., containing radical Islamists) and economic interests (i.e., access to the 
states’ natural resources) and this in turn supported the security apparatus of the two 
respective regimes.33 
In Bahrain, Libya, Syria and Yemen the military stayed loyal to their respective 
regimes, therefore the incumbent leaders managed to stay (longer) in power, but only few of 
them managed to solve the chaos they find themselves in: the Bahraini monarch managed to 
regain control, while the regimes of Libya and Yemen failed to reassert their power, the 
outcome of the civil war in Syria is still not determined. In both Tunisia and Egypt, the army 
chose to support protesters leading to the downfall of president Ben Ali and president 
Mubarak respectively.34 
 
External factors 
Another important determinant for regime stability is the extent of foreign support a 
government receives, says Williamson & Abadeer. 35  The Syrian government has been 
fighting rebels and without Iranian military aid Assad’s regime would have likely been 
collapsed, according to Williamson & Abadeer. The Libyan government had almost “crushed” 
rebel fighters until NATO intervened in the civil war. Thus, the meddling of foreign actors 
could alter the balance between the strength of the government and the opposition. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Bellin 2004, p.144-145 
33 Bellin 2004, p.149 
34 Gelvin 2012, p.27 
35 Williamson & Abadeer 2014 
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Another example of foreign influence is diplomatic pressure. Manheim says public 
diplomacy entails “efforts by the government of one nation to influence public or elite opinion 
in a second nation for the purpose of turning the foreign policy of the target nation to 
advantage”.36 Another component of public diplomacy according to Tuch is to spread 
knowledge on the “nation’s ideas and ideals, its institutions and culture, as well as its national 
goals, and current policies.”37 These efforts are different by nature from the use of force but 
they can shape the behavior of another actor in a way that is favored by the actor using 
diplomatic pressure. 
 
Relationship with minority groups 
Gelvin states strong ties between minority groups and the government increases regime 
stability, because they decrease the likelihood of the emergence of uprisings.38 One example 
of strong ties between government and minorities is the domination of minorities within the 
armed forces; see the paragraph below on “Role of the security apparatus”. In Syria, ethnic or 
religious minorities tend to support the Assad-regime, since they are fearful of persecution 
under rule of Sunni Muslims.39   
 
The role of the media 
Social media, such as Facebook, Twitter and blogs facilitated communication between 
participants of the uprisings, says Gelvin.40 A Facebook page called “We are all Khaled Said”, 
dedicated to the life of Egyptian national Khaled Said, for example, functioned as a virtual 
place for people to express discontent with the Egyptian regime. Gelvin, however, argues 
“there is no evidence to demonstrate that social media have played any more of a role in the 
current uprisings than the printing press and telegraph played in earlier uprisings.”41 Plattner 
argues that social media could be effectively used by autocrats to “counter’” uprisings.42 
Whether this was the case in the Arab uprisings is unknown. Plattner says so far, social media 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Manheim 1990, p.4 
37 Tuch 1990, p.3 
38 Gelvin 2012, p.101-103 
39 Khazan 2012 
40 Gelvin 2012, p.52 
41 Gelvin 2012, p.158 
42 Plattner 2011, p.11 
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seemed to be “more dangerous than helpful to authoritarians, especially in their remarkable 
ability to help mobilize large numbers of people in a very short time.”43  
One important transmitter for pan-Arabism during the uprisings has been Al Jazeera, a 
Qatar-based international news broadcaster with 60 news bureaus across the globe, argues 
Hale.44 Media and the Internet, of which Al Jazeera is one example, have the potential to unite 
people by emphasizing parallels between them.  
Research gap 
What do we need to take from this literature review? I conclude that the following structural 
factors are important determinants for the strength of authoritarian regimes, its opposition, or 
a combination of both: the role of opposition; regime type; personal rule of the autocrat; role 
of the security apparatus; nature of the economy; and external factors.  
While the Arab uprisings have been researched extensively on structural factors, they 
have not been thoroughly analyzed on the presence of diffusion mechanisms and its 
interaction with structural factors. I argue that we are missing a piece of the puzzle by solely 
focusing on structural factors. International media has hinted at the presence of transnational 
knowledge and tactics sharing between both elites and activists in the wake of Arab uprisings. 
It seems likely that diffusion mechanisms were present prior and during the uprisings and 
these in turn had some effect for the political outcomes. We should therefore in addition to 
structural explanations, also take into account the impact of decisions by elites and opposition 
actors alike for a better understanding of the nature and the outcomes of the Arab uprisings. 
To my understanding, however, no scholar has argued yet that diffusion mechanisms were 
present in the context of the recent Arab uprisings and how they affected the political events. 
Therefore, I aim to contribute to our understanding of the Arab uprisings by proposing the 
following theoretical framework. 
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Theoretical framework 
I will bring two competing explanations, namely an explanation based on structural factors 
and one centered on political diffusion, together in order to have a higher explanatory value 
for the roots and the results of the Arab uprisings. This method is based on how Beissinger 
operationalized his research on the colored revolutions.45 His theory, however, has not yet 
been applied yet to study the cases of the Arab Spring. I will adapt the theoretical framework 
from Beissinger with the structural factors most salient for the context of the uprisings in 
Egypt and Algeria. Beissinger developed a valuable theory centered on the interaction 
between structural factors and diffusion mechanisms that seeks to explain the emergence of 
uprisings and their consequences for regime sustainability.46 The key pillar of his theory is 
that certain preconditions or structural factors account for the emergence of uprisings within a 
state and the power of example could compensate for unfavorable structural factors. Thus, 
uprisings could emerge within a state that lacks (some) structural preconditions for uprisings 
due to the cross-case influence of the power of example. Beissinger argued that his theory is 
highly applicable to the colored revolutions and I want to investigate the explanatory value of 
his theory when applied to the Arab uprisings. 
Modular diffusion 
The theory of modular diffusion explains the geographical spread of collective action that 
follows a similar model. The theory of modular diffusion applies to uprisings, because 
uprisings are a type of collective action. I will evaluate the usability of studying the uprisings 
of Egypt and Algeria through the lens of modular diffusion. The driving force of modular 
diffusion, according to Beissinger, is the power of example: both political activists and 
political elites see successful uprisings that occurred elsewhere as a model that offers valuable 
lessons and tactics and they actively act upon the insights from prior experiences. Thus, prior 
uprisings serve as “an experience that has been consciously borrowed by others, spread by 
NGOs [stands for: nongovernmental organizations], and emulated by local social movements, 
forming the contours of a model.”47 Indicators of the presence of modular diffusion, according 
to Beissinger, are: the spread of “frames, strategies, repertoires and logos” from a successful 
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uprising to an adaptor.48 When assessing if mechanisms of modular diffusion are present we 
should look for cross-border communication and support between two or more actors. In the 
cases of Egypt and Algeria I will look at communication between government elites from 
different states as well as communication between citizens from different countries. 
Beissinger argues that the following five characteristics apply to the diffusion of 
modular phenomena. First, modular diffused activity is based on the inter-connectedness 
between cases, caused by similarities in “institutional characteristics, histories, cultural 
affinities, or modes of domination, allowing agents to make analogies across…” Second, the 
prospect of achieving success by emulating a specific model is the driving force of modular 
diffusion. In other words: people are motivated to copy strategies of prior uprisings when 
these are likely to change their status quo to something better.  Thirdly, the influence of prior 
examples on the emergence of collective action elsewhere follows a “tipping model” (see 
figure 1). A successful uprising in one state leads to a higher proportionality for emulation in 
another state.49 In the long run, however, this cumulative effect of successful collective action 
decreases and a second tipping point will be reached: the power of example eventually 
weakens. Fourthly, participants of former uprisings usually teach oppositional movements 
elsewhere how to organize themselves. Other parties that facilitate the proliferation of the 
model are “foreign states or NGOs”. They often provide “resources” and “skills.” Finally, two 
factors shape the timing and action of modular phenomena, namely the power of example and 
the structural conditions of a state.50   
Figure 1. Structural requirements and influence of example  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Beissinger 2007, p.263 
49 Beissinger, 2007, p.265-266. 
50 Beissinger 2007, p.263 
18	  
	  
	  
In this figure we see the interaction between two curves: the required structural factors for 
the outbreak of modular activity and the influence of prior examples on movements elsewhere. 
Original figure comes from Beissinger (2007, p.269) and goes by the name: “Figure 4 
Structural requirements for action and the influence of example in modular phenomena.”	  
 
Examples of modular diffused uprisings are: the democratic revolutions of Slovakia (1998) 
and Croatia (2000), the Bulldozer Revolution (2000) in Serbia, the Rose Revolution of 
Georgia (2003), the Orange Revolution (2004) in Ukraine, and the Tulip Revolution (2005) in 
Kyrgyzstan.51 All these uprisings that took place in former Soviet territory, collectively 
labeled as the “colored revolutions”, successfully ousted their authoritarian rulers. Uprisings 
in the former Soviet Union states Armenia, Belarus and Azerbaijan did not succeed.  
A slightly different example of a modular diffused uprising is the so-called Cedar 
revolution in Lebanon, which took place in 2005. The Lebanese uprising adopted several 
innovations from the successful revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine. The main differences, 
however, between the colored revolutions and the Lebanese revolution are the causes that lead 
to the uprisings as well as the type of demands by those oppositional figures involved.  
Activists in the colored revolutions primarily sought to move their country towards 
democratization, while the core demand of Lebanese protesters was the withdraw of Syrian 
armed forces from Lebanese territory and an international-led investigation to the murder on 
former Lebanese prime minister Rafik Hariri. Further, the colored revolutions were sparked 
by electoral fraud by respective regimes, while the Lebanese uprising was caused by a high 
profile political assassination. Lehoucq defines electoral fraud as “clandestine and illegal 
efforts to shape election results.”52 These actions can range from “procedural violations of 
electoral law” to “the outright use of violence to intimidate voters and poll watchers.” 
Outcome of an uprising  
Beissinger argues that uprisings have the highest probability to undermine regime stability 
during or immediate after elections, because in that timespan the regime is the most 
vulnerable to oppositional forces.53 We have seen that a national event that has nothing to do 
with elections (e.g., political assassinations) could also trigger the mobilization of the masses. 
A national event here refers to: a political situation that activates sentiments felt by a large 
part of the society and it must takes place in the immediate period (i.e., within one year) 
before the outbreak of protests. 
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The outcome of an uprising is also dependent on the extent the opposition learned 
from prior uprisings. Learning from prior cases could to some degree compensate for 
disadvantaged structural factors. Therefore, uprisings that might be considered less likely to 
succeed could sometimes succeed due to expertise gained through learning from prior 
examples. Thus, in cases where protesters have been in contact with or learned from 
protesters that were involved in prior successful uprisings, we expect a higher probability for 
a successful outcome compared to those cases that did not have cross-case learning. 
The probability for a successful outcome of an uprising increases when the movement 
involved in the uprising receives support from foreign governments or nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs). Thus, cases that received foreign aid are more likely to have a 
successful uprising compared to cases lacking foreign aid. The American government and 
democracy-promoting NGOs are well-known contributors to spread democratic values across 
the globe.54 The USA has given substantial financial and material help to prodemocracy 
movements in foreign states over time.55 Therefore, I will investigate if the opposition in 
Egypt and Algeria received support from the American government or USA-based 
organizations.  
Elite defection  
Regime stability is affected by the way political elites preempt or react to uprisings, either by 
elite defection or by elite learning, see figure 2 and figure 3. When elites from the security 
apparatus defect it becomes harder for the political regime to suppress an uprising. In that 
situation oppositional forces have a heightened chance to undermine regime stability. This 
causation is visualized in figure 2 by a drop in the functions “Institutional constraints on 
action” and “Structural requirements for successful action”, whereby the former refers to the 
strength of the government in opposing an uprising and the latter to the lowered demands of 
structural factors. Elite defection is fueled by “doubts about their [i.e., the political 
establishment] own legitimacy and the future of the structures they are defending” and it leads 
political elites to “co-opt opposition demands” or to “bail out”.56  
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Figure 2. Elite defection 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Here we see the impact of elite defection on the resistance of a government against an 
uprising and the threshold for a successful outcome of an uprising. Original figure comes 
from Beissinger (2007, p.269) and goes by the name: “Figure 5 Influence of example and 
institutional constraints on structural requirements for success in modular phenomena.”  
 
Elite learning  
Elite learning, on the other hand, entails the learning of “critical lessons” derived from prior 
collective action (in this thesis: uprisings) and incorporating “additional institutional 
constraints” (i.e., repressive measures) by political elites in order to oppose political change.57  
Thus, in this model political elites learn valuable lessons from prior uprisings elsewhere and 
they take steps accordingly to prepare against unrest within their states. When this mechanism 
is present political elites are in a stronger position (all conditions held constant) compared to 
uninformed political elites. Consequentially, oppositional forces are less likely to start an 
uprising in this scenario and their chances of waging a successful uprising are much slimmer 
compared to that situation without elite learning. The mechanism of elite learning is 
visualized in figure 3 by a small increase over time in the functions “Institutional constraints 
on action” and “Structural requirements for successful action”, whereby the former refers to 
the strength of the political elites in resisting an uprising and the latter to the prerequisites of a 
successful uprising. 
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Figure 3. Elite learning     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  
 
 
Here we see the impact of elite learning on the resistance of the political elite against an 
uprising as well as the threshold for a successful outcome of an uprising. Original figure 
comes from Beissinger (2007, p.269) and goes by the name: “Figure 5 Influence of example 
and institutional constraints on structural requirements for success in modular phenomena.”  
 
Argument 
I argue that states with more favorable structural factors for the emergence of uprisings are 
more likely to experience uprisings. If uprisings succeed elsewhere and citizens learn valuable 
lessons from prior uprisings, then a state requires less favorable conditions for the emergence 
of uprisings. Thus, learning by citizens could lower the threshold for successful collective 
action. Moreover, successful uprisings could function as a model that protesters elsewhere 
seek to emulate, while failed uprisings lower the probability of follow-ups. Therefore, the 
actions of political elites and opposition actors in one case influence other cases.  
Further, I argue that the outcome of an uprising is determined by the stability of the 
incumbent regime and the presence and nature of mechanisms of modular diffusion. A more 
robust presence of learning by the opposition increases the probability of the opposition to 
wage a successful uprising and therefore endangers regime continuation. The presence of elite 
defection also undermines authoritarian rule, since it lowers the threshold for collective action. 
The presence of elite learning, however, increases the odds for authoritarian sustainability and 
makes it harder for protesters to contest their government.  
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I argue that the interaction between modular diffusion and structural factors, as 
formulated by Beissinger, is a valuable theory in addition to the existing (mostly structural) 
explanations for the Arab Spring. To some extent, the emergence and consequences of 
uprisings in Egypt and Algeria can be explained by interplay between modular diffusion and 
structural factors.  
Hypotheses 
Here I will formulate the four hypotheses that I will put to test:  
§ H1: A case in which the opposition learns from other uprisings, has a higher 
probability for the emergence of a successful uprising and therefore endangers regime 
continuation, while lower levels of learning by the opposition decreases the 
probability for the advent of a successful uprising and therefore pose less a threat to 
the incumbent political elite.  
§ H2: Higher levels of elite defection lead to more collective action by the opposition, 
posing a greater threat to incumbent leaders compared to a case with lower levels of 
elite defection.  
§ H3: Higher levels of elite learning increases the odds for authoritarian sustainability 
while lower levels of elite learning make it easier for the opposition to contest their 
government and therefore undermine authoritarian rule.  
	  
	  
Research design 
The Arab Spring provides an excellent context to investigate how uprisings and the presence 
or absence of mechanisms of modular diffusion affect the sustainability of authoritarian 
regimes. I will conduct in-depth case studies of Algeria and Egypt. The backbone of these 
analyses will be literature studies of both primary and secondary sources. Algeria and Egypt 
are both authoritarian states with a fairly homogenous society. The rule of these states is not 
based on hereditary, as is the case in many states in the region. Moreover, the ruling elites do 
not in particular represent any subset of the society. Thus, the political leaders of Algeria and 
Egypt represent the entire nation.  
These two cases are both republics, and the respective political elites have used 
repressive tactics to stay in power for over a long time, often under the façade of emergency 
laws or the war on terrorism. Algeria and Egypt are located in close proximity to each other in 
the region of the MENA and their structural factors are somewhat similar, but these cases had 
different outcomes in terms of regime continuation and regime change. Egyptian president 
Hosni Mubarak needed to leave his position shortly after mass demonstrations commenced, 
while Algerian president Abdelaziz Bouteflika managed to stay in power. Algeria and Egypt 
share largely similar independent variables, yet they had different outcomes of the uprisings. 
Therefore the research design is a Most Similar Systems Design. 
Operationalization  
The dependent variable (further abbreviated to: DV) is the effect of uprisings on regime 
stability, see table 1. In this thesis I judge whether an uprising succeeded or failed based on its 
ability to meet its most vital demands within half a year after the emergence of the initial 
protest. In the cases of Egypt and Algeria the crucial demands of the opposition were the 
removal of their respective authoritarian leaders. Thus my interpretation of a successful 
uprising is as follows: a successful uprising leads to the removal of the chief of state or head 
of government from power within six months after protests began. The variation on the DV 
allows investigating the causal logic between the IVs and the DV. 
I use three independent variables (further abbreviated to: IV): independent variable 1 
(IV1) refers to the probability for the emergence of uprisings within a state; independent 
variable 2 (IV2) indicates regime robustness in the wake of uprisings. The third independent 
variable, (IV3), entails the presence or absence of mechanisms of modular diffusion.  
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In this work I don’t make any predictions on the long-term effects of the uprisings, 
since these effects of the Arab Spring are yet to be materialized. Therefore I focus solely on 
the immediate results of uprisings in Algeria and Egypt. 
Table 1. Dependent variable and independent variables 
Variable	   Description	   Attribute	   Value	  
DV	   The effect of uprisings on 
regime stability 
Regime continuation or 
regime change	  
Yes/no	  
IV1 The probability for the 
emergence of uprisings within a 
state 
Emergence of uprisings 
or lack there of 
From very unlikely to 
very likely 
 
 
 
 
IV2 Regime robustness in the wake 
of uprisings 
Strength of the regime From very weak to 
very strong 
IV3	   The presence or absence of 
mechanisms of modular 
diffusion	  
-Elite learning 
-Elite defection 
-Learning by the 
opposition	  
Yes/no; and in-depth 
qualitative report	  
Structural factors for the emergence of Arab uprisings 
Below I present the structural factors most salient to the context of Egypt and Algeria for the 
emergence of uprisings. These structural factors are based on the literature review and 
theoretical framework. IV1 is a composite of these structural factors. These structural factors 
are grouped in the sub-categories economic factors; demographics; social factors; and regime 
factors see table 2.  
Table 2. Structural requirements for the emergence of uprisings  
Structural factor Relation 
Strength of ties between the 
regime and the West 
Stronger ties increase the probability for the emergence of 
uprisings 
Enrollment rates in higher 
education 
High rates of enrollment in higher education increases the 
chances for uprisings 
Level of wealth of citizens Higher levels of wealth increases the chances for uprisings to 
emerge 
Economic dependency on 
export of natural resources 
A higher dependency on the export of natural resources 
decreases the chance for the emergence of uprisings 
Unity of opposition A fragmented opposition decreases the prospect for the 
emergence of uprisings, while a unified opposition increases 
the chance for uprisings 
Political rights More repressive states have a lowered chance for the 
emergence of uprisings, compared to less repressive states 
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Structural factors that advance regime stability in the wake of uprisings 
Here I present the structural factors most salient to the context of Egypt and Algeria for 
regime stability in the wake of uprisings. These structural factors are based on the literature 
review and theoretical framework. IV2 is a composite of these structural factors, see table 3.  
Table 3. Structural factors and regime stability in the wake of uprisings 
Structural factor Relation 
Loyalty and effectiveness 
of the security apparatus 
and the military 
 
An authoritarian regime that possesses a loyal and effective 
security apparatus as well as military, is more likely to survive 
uprisings, compared to regimes lacking such a structural factor 
Penetration of new and 
alternative media outlets 
A state that has a deeper penetration of new media or social 
media and alternative media outlets poses a greater threat to 
regime stability compared to a state that has a lower presence of 
new media and alternative media.  
Timing of the uprising The stability of a regime is more endangered when uprisings 
take place in close proximity to fraud elections or a national 
event, compared to uprising that takes place outside of this 
timeframe.  
Mechanisms of modular diffusion 
Here I will explain the way I will operationalize IV3. The mechanisms of modular diffusion 
are sorted in the three sub-groups: elite learning, elite defection and learning by the opposition. 
 
Elite learning 
We will measure elite learning in Algeria and Egypt by analyzing public statements of 
government officials on content that references to uprisings in other states, such as Tunisia for 
example. I will also investigate scholarly and newspaper articles that engage in elite reactions 
in the wake of Arab uprisings. While elite rhetoric not always coincides with elite behavior or 
political decisions, it is one of the only reliable instruments to measure elite learning. I expect 
political elites to gain a good understanding of elite reactions that are highly successful and 
those that are doomed to fail in the wake of mass mobilization. While designing policies I 
expect political elites to adapt successful innovations of prior uprisings to the unique political 
characteristics and demands of their state. Again, when elites in certain states perform similar 
behavior as those elites in other states we do not have traced elite learning yet. Elite learning 
encompasses knowing and analyzing what happens in other cases, subtracting valuable 
lessons from them and implementing these in their own unique political landscape. I aim to 
find references in public statements to the presence of these steps.  
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Elite defection 
Elite defection refers to those political elites belonging to the government, judiciary, or 
security apparatus that either refuses to obey orders in the wake of uprisings or chooses to 
step down from power or join the opposition. I will use scholarly and newspaper articles to 
find evidence the presence or absence of this mechanism and its consequences for the 
outcome of an uprising.  
 
Learning by the opposition 
Indications of learning by the opposition are the use of tactics and innovations that were used 
in prior uprisings, combined with a reference to the uprising. When similar behavior takes 
place in various states there need not to be diffusion per se. But when we find statements of 
individuals that support the causal chain then we can be more secure of the presence of 
learning by the opposition. When we find evidence for the fact that Egyptians or Algerians 
intentionally copied strategies from prior uprisings, then we can be confident about the 
presence of the learning by the opposition mechanism.  
	  
	  
	  
An introduction to the Arab Spring 
The analysis is structured as follows: in the first part I will present the Tunisian uprisings. 
This will be helpful later on in the analysis. Then I will provide an overview of the Arab 
Spring as a whole, in order to have a general understanding about the turmoil in the region.  
 I conclude the analysis by arguing that the absence of significant citizen learning in 
Algeria explains why the Algerian uprisings did not succeed. Algeria had a less favorable 
structural makeup for successful uprisings, compared to Egypt. I found evidence for the fact 
that elite learning was present with the Algerian political elite. Consequentially, the structural 
requirements for successful action in Algeria rose.  
Uprisings in Egypt on the other hand severely undermined regime continuation. Egypt 
was more prone to successful uprisings, due to its favorable structural factors. Moreover, elite 
defection was common with the Egyptian political elite during the uprisings. On the other 
hand, a significant level of citizen learning took place in Egyptian.  
 
The Tunisian uprisings 
We need to investigate the key characteristics of the recent Tunisian uprisings in order to 
understand the Arab Spring as a whole and to evaluate if the Tunisian uprisings influenced 
political events in Egypt and Algeria respectively. I argue that the Tunisian experience set an 
example for Egypt, Algeria and the entire region of the MENA. The Jasmine Revolution of 
Tunisia was the first uprising in the region that resulted in the fall of an authoritarian ruler. 
In Tunisia, police and security forces often cracked down on political dissidents. 
Peaceful demonstrations in 2008 by mineworkers in the Southern places Gafsa and Gabés 
were violently crushed by Tunisian security forces. That event marks the beginning of 
organized protest against the regime. Earlier, people shared anti-government sentiments only 
in private places. To publicly question the regime was something unprecedented. 
Mohamed Bouazizi was a Tunisian national who repeatedly sold fruit in forbidden 
areas and therefore often clashed with a police officer. He was treated badly by the police on 
December 17, 2010 and frustrated with the state of affairs he poured fuel over his whole body 
in front of the municipal building the next day and somehow he was set on fire. Some say that 
Mohamed didn’t intend to commit suicide, but believe that the event was a tragic accident. In 
the hospital Mohamed died of his burnings. Shortly hundreds of citizens marched on the street 
to protest in result of the death of this young man. In December 2010 the news agency 
Reuters wrote that “riots are extremely rare” and that Tunisia “is one of the most prosperous 
28	  
	  
	  
and stable [states] in the region.”58 The journalists are clearly surprised that hundreds of 
citizens marched the street unexpectedly in such a stable state. Protests spread within Tunisia 
and transnational. On December 24, lawyers in Kasserine gathered to show support for the 
people of Sidi Bouzid. In these demonstrations the regime used live ammunition on the 
protesters, resulting in the spread of revolutions to the North of the country and an increase in 
the intensity of the demonstrations. On December 28, president Ben Ali visited Mohamed 
Bouazizi in the hospital. Meanwhile demonstrations were held in the capital city Tunis, with 
approximately 1000 people attending.  
The Tunisian regime could not keep up with the power of the Internet. Videos of the 
demonstrations and the funeral of Bouazizi spread within the country and across the globe, by 
Facebook and Al Jazeera. Even when the Tunisian government disconnected the Internet, 
citizens were able to send images and videos captured with cellphones to Al Jazeera. On 
January 9, 2011 the regime ordered Special Forces sniper units to shoot on the demonstrators 
in Kasserine. Videos of the massacre quickly spread across the world, since users uploaded 
captured images of the event on Facebook. Approximately 20 people were killed in this 
violent crackdown. Police forces used live ammunition on protesters in Tunis (i.e., the capital 
city of Tunisia) on the 13th of January. President Ben Ali enacted emergency laws and ordered 
his army to shoot at citizens, yet senior military officials disobeyed the command and told 
their president to leave. This resulted in the departure of Tunisian president Zine al-Abidine 
Ben Ali around January 15, 2011, that’s only a month after the outbreak of protests.59  
A local demonstration against the municipal government of Sidi Bouzid took place a 
day after the self-immolation by Muhammad Bouazizi.60 Protests spread to towns in the 
region and reached Tunis by January 13, 2011. The government used violent tactics in an 
effort to suppress demonstrations. These acts caused several deaths in Thala and twenty-one 
deaths in Kasserine. On January 13, 2011, the army was ordered not to shoot at 
demonstrators.61 President Ben Ali fled to Saudi Arabia on January 14, 2011.  
The Tunisian economy performed relatively well, yet the regime was involved in all 
sort of activities that discredited its legitimacy. Two driving forces of the Tunisian uprisings 
were dissatisfaction of Tunisians with the prospect of their economic development and the 
impossibility to express their political opinions freely. Chomiak argues that citizens 
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collectively protested against the regime because of “widespread and longstanding feelings of 
oppression, mostly socio-economic but also political and symbolic.”62 The direct cause for the 
emergence of protests in Tunisia was the self-immolation of Muhammad Bouazizi in Sidi 
Bouzid.63   
I argue that electoral fraud did not cause the emergence of uprisings in Tunisia. 
Electoral procedures in Tunisia in 2009 contradict free and fair elections. Human Rights 
Watch argues that a few days prior to the 2009 Tunisian elections a large amount of 
deviations from good practices of democracy occurred: “tailor-made laws have prevented the 
candidates from some of the stronger opposition parties from running, and severe constraints 
on freedoms of expression, the press, and assembly have deprived challengers from making 
their case to the public.”64 In 2009 Human Rights Watch stated that the “government is 
restricting access to media for the parties and candidates that remain in the running.”65 A body 
appointed by the president performs the electoral monitoring in Tunisia and there is no 
domestic or foreign organization that independently monitors the elections. Whether the 
Tunisian government has consciously fraud the elections of 2009 is unsure. 
The nature of the Arab Spring 
The MENA was ruled by dictatorships, prior to the Arab uprisings. With the closure of the 
Cold War, many states made the transition from authoritarian rule to democratic rule.66 
Initially, this transition seemed to have found follow-up in the MENA, but soon autocrats in 
the region tightened their authoritarian stronghold. In late 2010 and 2011, the region faced 
events of historic proportion that potentially could lead to democratization.  
The Arab Spring consists of “a wave of turmoil” that reached “nearly every Arab 
country” and anti-government demonstrations varied in terms of “size and intensity”, 
according to Williamson & Abadeer.67 The uprisings originated in Tunisia in late 2010 and 
spread throughout the region, from Morocco in the west to Yemen in the east. Gause says that 
the Arab uprisings were homegrown and not manipulated by external powers, “…the Arab 
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revolts resulted not from policy decisions taken in Washington or any other foreign capital but 
from indigenous economic, political, and social factors…”68  
 The protests of the Arab Spring were spontaneous, leaderless, diverse, and loosely 
organized, and these characteristics in turn have been “their greatest strength and their 
greatest liability,” says Gelvin.69 Each Arab uprising had its own origins, experiences and 
outcomes. Millions of Arabs wanted their respective president to leave office; in their eyes 
their rulers lacked legitimacy.70 News outlets commonly describe this collection of events as 
the calls through peaceful demonstrations of ordinary citizens in the MENA for human 
dignity, democratization and civil rights. 
After several weeks of protests in Tunisia protests spread across borders into for 
example Egypt, Libya and Syria. Protests in Tunisia and elsewhere were filmed and uploaded 
to Facebook and or Al Jazeera. Al Jazeera broadcasted these images and videos on their 
television channel. 
The revolutions of Tunisia and Egypt have been relatively peaceful. Libya, Yemen, 
Syria and Bahrain face a different reality. There the situation deteriorated into widespread 
violent confrontations or civil war and foreign intervention, since the regime will stop at 
nothing. In the case of Libya, the international community decided upon the establishment of 
a no-fly zone in order to protect citizens against the use of violence by the Gadhafi regime.71 
The Syrian government used live fire on its nation. Likewise, the Bahraini monarch ordered 
his security forces to shoot at protesters and invited the GCC to suppress the domestic unrest.  
In January 2011 protests took place in Yemen similar to those in Tunisia and Egypt. 
President Saleh was supposed to rule until 2013, but protesters wanted to see him leave 
earlier.72 Another demand of protesters was the release from prison of several human rights 
activists and journalists.73 The protesters used multiple strategies such as the translation of 
protest slogans into English in order to gain the attention of the international community.74 
The uprisings in Yemen have been described as follows, “the uprising here was not swift and 
triumphant like the revolutions of Tunisia or Egypt, or the all-out warfare of Libya and Syria. 
Rather, a slow-burning revolution of sit-ins, negotiations and international pressure has 
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pushed out Mr. Saleh, making him the fourth Arab autocrat forced from power in the wave of 
popular uprisings that continue to roil the region.”75 
Tawakkol Karmam is a Yemeni journalist and human rights activist. She belonged to a 
peaceful student movement and she worked for the non-profit organization Women 
Journalists Without Chains. Women Journalists Without Chains is one of the four Yemeni-
based NGOs that receive assistance from the National Democratic Institute (a major USA-
based pro-democracy NGO).76 A speech by Ms. Karmam shows the interdependence between 
uprisings of the Arab Spring, “we will continue this struggle and the Jasmine Revolution until 
the removal of this corrupt system that looted the wealth of the Yemenis.”77 Another example 
is that Yemeni students showed a Tunisian flag on a banner at Sana’a University, while 
shouting, “hail Tunisia — the sweet smell of Jasmine woke us up!”78 The words “Jasmine” or 
“Jasmine Revolution” refer to the Tunisian upheavals of late December 2010 and January 
2011. Another indicator of interdependence is that Yemeni protesters wore pink bandanas and 
pink scarfs referring to Jasmine Revolution on February 3, 2011.79 
Yemeni activists learned from Egyptian protesters that operated at Tahir square. 
Emulating the model of Egyptian demonstrators, Yemeni protesters searched other 
demonstrators on weapons upon entering protests in order for the protests to stay nonviolent. 
Similarly to the Egyptian revolution, the American-based and American-funded NGOs the 
International Republican Institute, the National Democratic Institute and Freedom House 
aided the Yemeni revolution.  
Gause notices the similar (re-) actions of Arab autocrats in the wake of Tunisian and 
Egyptian uprisings, “Seeing what happened in Cairo and Tunis, other Arab leaders rushed to 
placate their citizens by raising state salaries, cancelling planned subsidy cuts, and increasing 
the number of state jobs.”80 Jordan for example halted its economic liberalization and Saudi 
Arabia pledged to provide more financial relief.81 Shortly after the downfall of president Ben 
Ali, the government of Kuwait promised its citizens “US$3,500 as well as a year’s worth of 
free staples such as sugar, cooking oil, and milk.”82 In February 2011 Saudi Arabia’s 
government announced a “$80-billion package of public-sector wage hikes, unemployment 
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payments, increased college stipends, and investments in low-income housing.” 83  In 
September 2011 the government of Qatar tried to prevent unrest by announcing public 
spending worth $8 billion, says Brownlee et al.84  
Causes of the Arab uprisings 
Brownlee et al. argue that there were no structural factors in the Arab states that account for 
the emergence of uprisings and as such they came unexpected to the respective 
governments.85 I believe in retrospect, however, that many indicators should have alarmed 
governments and experts alike. One such indicator is the emergence of so-called “bread riots” 
in the region ever since 2007, due to rising food prices.86 Food prices had risen in the Arab 
world since the early 2000s due to crop failures and drought. The global economic crisis of 
2008 put even more pressure on the already vulnerable Arab food supply chain and 
economies.  
Al Jazeera agrees that the MENA was prone for uprisings, due to the presence of the 
following structural factors: the prolonged rule of dictatorships using so-called “emergency 
laws”; the violation of human rights; the high amount of political prisoners; the use of torture 
by the regime; the lack of free press and the extensive use of censorship; high numbers of 
poverty; especially large numbers of youth unemployment over 50%.87  Of these factors, the 
most important causes of the Arab Spring were dissatisfaction among young middle class 
students with the lack of career prospects and the high number of unemployed youth. Gelvin 
argues that in recent years the youth cohort increased severely in the Arab world and most of 
the respective governments could not provide them with jobs.88   
The Arab economies combined elements of a state-controlled economy with those of 
liberal markets, increasing the gap between rich and poor and deepened corruption. This type 
of economy was labeled “crony capitalism”, because public assets came in the hands of 
wealthy and corrupt individuals, “so-called crony capitalists.”89 Privatization in Tunisia and 
Egypt undermined regime stability, says Gause, since it led to the emergence of a new class of 
super-rich individuals that was highly unpopular with the rest of the nation. Overall, the Arab 
economies grew steadily in the years prior to the Arab uprisings but so did the ever-increasing 
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divide between rich and poor citizens. These two processes led citizens belonging to the 
middle class and high-educated youngsters to participate in protests, says Gelvin.90 
Some argue that not violations of political and civil rights, but economic concerns 
caused the massive unrest in Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt and Yemen, “Mohamed Bouazizi [i.e., 
the Tunisian fruits seller that set himself on fire and caused the Tunisian uprisings] didn't set 
himself on fire because he couldn't blog or vote. People set themselves on fire because they 
can't stand seeing their family wither away slowly, not of sorrow, but of cold stark hunger.” 91  
Egyptian protesters wanted to get rid of president Mubarak, because in their eyes he 
was a dictator. Egyptians did not necessarily want to change the legal and constitutional 
make-up of the state, since the constitution provided democratic principles. The key cause for 
the Egyptian revolution was that citizens were dissatisfied with certain policies of the 
Mubarak administration leading to “torture, poverty, corruption and unemployment.”92 An 
incentive for Egyptians to rebel was the murder on Egyptian national Khaled Said, according 
to Gelvin.93  
Pan-Arabism, the “idea that all Arabs share a common political identity and fate”, 
facilitated the transnational spread of uprisings, says Gause.94 It allowed Arabs to relate to 
each other identities and destinies and it drove Arabs to rebel. When the people of Tunisia and 
then Egypt overthrew their corrupt dictators, other Arabs found they could identify with them. 
The fact that these revolts succeeded, gave hope (in some cases false hope) to Arabs living in 
other states.  
Effects  
Some argue that the Arab Spring is not a result in itself, but rather a first step for the MENA 
to make a democratic transition and it is a sign to the world community that these states will 
fight against economic and political injustice.95 Some are skeptic, such as Rabab el-Mahdi 
from the American university in Cairo. El-Mahdi argues that the Arab Spring, so far, failed to 
bring upon any structural change yet. In most cases, the protesters did not replace the ancient 
régime.  
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Tunisia is the only Arab Spring’ state that indicates some sort of democratic transition. 
Internet activist Lina Ben Mhenni argues, however, that there is still a long road ahead for 
Tunisia in the post-Ben Ali era.96 Ben Mhenni argues that Tunisian citizens still lack freedom 
of expression and that the police forces still use disproportional violence in reaction to 
demonstrations.97  
After 30 years of rule president Saleh needed to step down from power as a result of 
domestic and foreign pressures. President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi led the Yemeni regime 
after the removal of president Saleh.98 The Gulf Cooperation Council pressured president 
Saleh to step down from power and have vice-president Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi take over 
his position.99 President Saleh managed to stay in power much longer after the outbreak of 
democratic protests compared to his counterparts in Tunisia and Egypt.  
The unrest in Yemen developed into a violent state of affairs: “while rival political and 
military factions continue to battle in Yemen's urban centers, fighting endures in the country's 
rural tribal areas as well. Virtually impossible for Western journalists to cover, fighting in the 
Arhab and Nihm regions of the Sana'a governorate between tribesmen and loyalist military 
forces have gone on for months with Arhabis threatening to seize control of the Sana'a airport 
several times.”100 Another layer in the demonstrations that turned into widespread conflict is 
religious-inspired violence. In the northern provinces Al-Jawf and Sa’ada we see the violent 
struggle between Houthi, “a Shiite insurgent group that is reportedly supported by Iran,” 101 
and fundamentalist Suniis.102 
The outcome of the Egyptian uprisings would be crucial for the United States, since 
the political processes that Egypt experiences create a “precedent for smaller countries in the 
region.”103 Vital issues for the USA at stake in these events were: the relationship between 
Islam and democracy; and the dealings between Israel vis-à-vis Arab states.  
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Analysis 
First, I will introduce the history, political system, economic and social system of Egypt and 
Algeria in order to create a context in which I will investigate the interplay between structural 
factors and mechanisms of modular diffusion. The crux of the analysis will be the behavior of 
the opposition and the political elite of Egypt and Algeria respectively in the wake of 
uprisings. 
Recent history of Egypt 
Egypt (formally: The Arab Republic of Egypt) gained some degree of independence from the 
Ottoman Empire in 1914 and partial independence in 1922. Egypt only gained full 
independence from Britain on July 23, 1952.104 Ever since the coup d’état of Nasser in 1952, 
Egypt has been ruled by military dictatorships.105 Hosni Mubarak rose to power on October 
14, 1981,106 shortly after Anwar al-Sadat, former president of Egypt, was murdered.107 
Mubarak ruled over Egypt for almost three decades. 
Political situation Egypt 
Prior to the Arab uprisings, Egypt had multiparty systems in which one party dominated. The 
dominating party of Egypt was the National Democratic Party.108 The Mubarak administration 
erected so-called emergency laws right after the death of Sadat. The emergency laws led to 
restrictions on civil liberties such as the prohibition on gathering with more than five 
individuals to perpetrate a peaceful demonstration.109 ElBaradei argues that these laws 
enabled the government to monitor university campuses to “ensure that students do not 
engage in political activities.”110 In March 2010, the American government criticized the 
Egyptian government for using emergency laws to restrict Egyptians in their civil rights.111  
Domestically, president Mubarak successfully used a variety of tactics to maintain its 
power: suppressing oppositional forces; manipulating public opinion; establishing emergency 
laws to prohibit political demonstrations and persecuting citizens without trial. US Assistant 
secretary Posner argues that the Egyptian government has made it difficult for 
nongovernmental organizations to do their work.  
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Recent history of Algeria  
The 20th century C.E. of Algeria (formally: The People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria) has 
been violent according to Gelvin.112 A long and violent war of independence was fought 
between Algeria and colonial power France. The duration of this war of independence was 
eight years, resulting in more than a million deaths.113  France and the USA recognized 
Algeria’s independence on July 3, 1962.114   
The key events that took place in Algeria after it gained independence were a coup 
d’état by the Algerian army in 1987,115 followed by a civil war, which lasted from late 1991 
until 2002. The civil war commenced after the results of democratic elections were announced 
and the war was fought out between Islamists and the army.116  Between 100.000 and 120.000 
Algerians were killed in the civil war and the whole society suffered from posttraumatic stress 
syndrome.117  
Gelvin says that uprisings were common ever since 2001.118 Achy argues, however, 
that uprisings are not likely to occur in Algeria, because Algerians prefer the status quo to the 
prospect of extreme violence. 119  Gelvin argues that participants of these revolts were 
dissatisfied with economic policy and “arbitrary rule”.120  Moreover, high numbers of 
Algerian youth tried to leave their country illegally because they were fed up with humiliation, 
poverty and corruption.121  
Political situation Algeria 
Prior to the Arab Spring, Algeria also had a multiparty system dominated by one party, 
namely the National Liberation Front. The key figure of the National Liberation Front is 
president Abdelaziz Bouteflinka. He has been in office ever since April 27, 1999, and he is 
still in power.122 The government did not allow the emergence of a free and fair political 
system, therefore the Algeria political system could not flourish. The opposition is 
manipulated, co-opted or undermined.123 The Algerian government has enforced so-called 
emergency laws. These were officially designed to smoothen the fight against terrorism, but 
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some argue that these laws have been abused by the regime in order to suppress the 
opposition.124  
The Algerian government has been described as: “a clutch of army generals, 
intelligence officials and aides, including Saïd Bouteflika, the president’s brother, surrounds 
the president, and only loyalists are promoted.”125 The prime minister of Algeria heads the 
committee that monitors the elections.  
Achy argues that corruption and poor economic planning was common in Algeria, 
“The World Bank Doing Business report of 2011 ranked Algeria 136 of 183 countries for 
overall ease for businesses there—behind Tunisia, Morocco, and most other countries in the 
Middle East and North Africa. Similarly, the Transparency International report rated Algeria 
poorly because of its public finance mismanagement and the prevalence of bribery.”126 
 
Probabilities for the emergence of uprisings 
Here I will look at the structural make-up of Egypt and Algeria prior to the emergence of the 
Arab Spring. First, I will evaluate the strength of ties between the West and the government of 
Egypt and Algeria respectively. The rationale is that strong ties between an authoritarian 
regime and the West increase the probability for the emergence of uprisings within an 
authoritarian state. In the aftermath of 9/11, many dictatorships of the MENA collaborated 
with the USA in the so-called “Global War on Terror (GWOT).”127 I conclude that Egypt had 
the strongest ties with the West, far stronger than the ties between the West and Algeria. 
Consequentially, based on this structural factor, Egypt has a higher probability for the 
emergence of uprisings compared to Algeria. 
Algeria has strong diplomatic ties with the entire international community, including 
the West.128 Gall argues that Algeria is a strategic ally of the USA since it has “vast oil wealth, 
a powerful army and intelligence service, and experience in fighting Islamic terrorism.”129 
Sanjeev Bery from Harvard University argues, however, that the West had the strongest ties 
with Mubarak’s Egypt.130 The West invested in Mubarak for decades, due to centrality of 
Egypt in the Arab world. In its thirty-year existence, the Mubarak-regime received military 
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aid (1.3 billion US dollar annually) from the USA in exchange for democratic reform that 
never came.131 Gelvin argues that Egypt was of great importance to the American government 
due, because it is “key to resolving the Israeli-Palestine conflict” and it “carries a great deal of 
weight in the Arab World simply because of its size.” Gelvin argues that the USA also has 
strong ties with Yemen, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, but he does not name Algeria. 
Next I will compare the enrollment rates in higher education between Egypt and 
Algeria. This is of major importance, since higher rates of enrollment in higher education 
increases the chance for the emergence of uprisings. To measure the proportion of high-
educated citizens within Algeria and Egypt I used the indicator School enrollment tertiary (% 
gross) from the World Development Indicators by the World Bank. This indicator points out 
the percentage of the total population that is enrolled in higher education. I argue that Egypt is 
more probable to experience uprisings, due to a higher rate of school enrollment in tertiary 
education. In 2009 and 2010, however, the difference between Egypt and Algeria in terms of 
school enrollment was very small, see table 4. 
 Table 4. School enrollment, tertiary (% gross) 
 2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2009 
2010 
Algeria 15 17 18 18 20 20 22 - 29 29 
Egypt 31 32 29 30 32 31 32 32 32 33 
A “-“ refers to the lack of data in that year. More information about the variable can be found in the Appendix.  
 
The next structural factor that will be analyzed is the level of wealth of citizens. The 
underlying logic is that higher levels of wealth of citizens increase the chances for the 
emergence of uprisings. As a measure for economic performance I will use GNI per capita, 
PPP. This indicator stands for the Gross national income (GNI) based on purchasing power 
parity (PPP). As such it could help us to grasp how much money citizens of Algeria and 
Egypt respectively had available to purchase goods and services prior to the Arab uprisings. I 
have used data from the World Development Indicators by the World Bank. I conclude that 
Algeria had a slightly higher level of citizen income and that relative increases the chance for 
the emergence of uprisings in Algeria, compared to Egypt. However, the differences between 
these two states with regard to this structural factor are small and decreasing in the period 
from 2005-2010. 
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Table 5. GNI per capita, PPP  
 2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2009 
2010 
Algeria 10.290 10.690 11.440 11.760 11.780 12.220 
Egypt 7.610 8.560 9.100 9.760 10.070 10.360 
 
Now, I will proceed by comparing the dependency on the export of natural resources between 
Egypt and Algeria. A lower dependency on the export of natural resources increases the 
chance of the emergence of uprisings. Based on this structural factor, I therefore argue that 
Egypt had a far higher chance for the emergence of uprisings, compared to Algeria. In 2010, 
the export of petroleum and natural gas made up 25.14% of Algeria’s GDP. That is more than 
double the share (11.51%) of the export of natural resources to the Egyptian GDP.  
Table 6. Revenue export petroleum and natural gas combined (% of GDP) 
 2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2009 
2010 
Algeria 42,68 41,02 37,51 40,90 25,60 25,14 
Egypt 25,74 23,98 22,70 25,88 11,50 11,51 
 
Here I will argue that the Algerian opposition was more fragmented compared to Egypt. A 
fragmented opposition decreases the prospect for the emergence of uprisings, therefore 
Algeria had a lower chance to experience uprisings compared to Egypt. Achy argues that in 
Algeria, in contrast to Tunisia, Egypt and Yemen, different segments of society did not unite 
in their fight against the government, “in spite of the sporadic demonstrations and of the calls 
for change from prominent intellectuals and political figures, a unifying movement that 
transcends societal divisions is yet to be seen in Algeria.”132 Markey and Chikhi argue that the 
Algerian opposition is “weak and divided.” 133  Gelvin states that in Algeria there are 
“divisions within the protest movement on everything from tactics to goals.”134 The Algerian 
protests umbrella organization The Coordination for Democratic Change in Algeria lacked 
legitimacy according to Boundaoui.135 This was caused because Algerians believed several 
political parties used the protests for personal gain.  
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Egypt, on the other hand, had a more unified opposition. Both secular and religious 
Egyptian for example worked together guided by Dr. ElBaradei, Nobel laureate and 
opposition leader. 136  The main participants in the Egyptians uprisings were urban 
professionals and government employees.137 Egyptian youth from all walks of life worked 
together in an umbrella organization or coalition. Hill says the following about this coalition, 
“The youth coalition officially includes six groups: April 6, Justice and Freedom, and the 
ElBaradei affiliates, as well as the Muslim Brotherhood, the Democratic Front party, and 
independents.”138 I conclude that the Egyptian opposition was far more unified compared to 
the Algerian opposition and therefore (based on this structural factor) Egypt was more likely 
to experience the emergence of uprisings. 
 Lastly, the nature of political rights influences the mobilization of movements. 
Movement formation is harder in more repressive states compared to less repressive states. 
Consequentially, it is more probable that uprisings emerge in states in which citizens have 
more political freedom compared to states in which citizens enjoy less political freedom. To 
assess the political freedom in Egypt and Algeria respectively, I will use the political rights 
score from the Freedom House’ Freedom in the World 2010 report. Political rights are 
expressed in a number ranging from 1 (best) to 7 (worst). Thus, a lower number refers to a 
higher level of political freedom. In the 2010 report I found that the political rights of Algeria 
and Egypt were comparable, since they both have allocated the number 6. I conclude, based 
on this measurement, that the political rights in Algeria and Egypt did not significantly 
differed. Moreover, the repressive nature of the respective regimes of Egypt and Algeria could 
be a strong impediment against the formation of opposition. 
 I argue that Egypt had is more favorable structural factors for the emergence compared 
to Algeria, since Egypt has the strongest ties with the West; the highest level of tertiary school 
enrollments; is less dependent on the export of natural resources and it’s opposition was way 
more unified. Algeria, however, has a slightly higher level of citizen income, expressed in 
GNI per capita. Algeria and Egypt had comparable political rights prior to the Arab uprisings. 
These structural factors indicate that the probability for the emergence of uprisings was much 
higher in Egypt than in Algeria, see figure 4.  
This finding implies that Egypt would also be an earlier riser in the sequence of 
uprisings. Both Egypt and Algeria faced uprisings in 2010 or 2011 and the abovementioned 
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structural factors, to some extend, shaped the impact of these uprisings on the respective 
regimes. In relation to Algeria, many more citizens participated in uprisings in Egypt. Also, 
unity within the Egyptian opposition posed a greater threat to the incumbent ruler compared 
to the fragmented opposition in Algeria. I will elaborate on -and add to- these arguments in 
the next section.  
Figure 4. Structural requirements for action and the influence of the Tunisian uprisings  
This figure is an adaption of Beissinger’s figure entitled “Figure 4 Structural requirements 
for action and the influence of example in modular phenomena,” see Beissinger (2007, p.269). 
I adapted this figure to visualize the interaction between structural factors and the influence 
of prior examples of Egypt and Algeria respectively.  We see three curves in this graph: the 
required structural factors for the outbreak of modular activity in Egpyt (expressed with black 
cubes); the influence of prior examples on uprisings elsewhere (visualized by a black solid 
line); and I added an extra line, a black-coloured dashed line, to indicate the required 
structural factors for the outbreak of uprisings in Algeria.  
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Regime stability in Egypt and Algeria 
Now we will proceed by analyzing the course of the uprisings in Egypt and Algeria and its 
direct impact on regime stability. I will do this by applying the structural factors that 
strengthen authoritarian regimes in the wake of uprisings to the cases of Egypt and Algeria.  
 
Loyalty and effectiveness of the security apparatus and military 
First, I will evaluate the loyalty and effectiveness of the security apparatus and the military. 
The underlying logic is that authoritarian regimes that posses a loyal and effective security 
apparatus as well as military are more likely to survive uprisings compared to regimes lacking 
such capabilities. To analyze the efficiency and the loyalty of the authoritarian regimes of 
Algeria and Egypt we need to incorporate the size of its armed forces as well as its security 
forces. A large quantity of armed forces and security forces could strengthen the capacity of a 
repressive regime to crackdown on dissent citizens when necessary. Apart from knowing the 
size in absolute numbers of the different segments of armed forces and security forces in 
Algeria and Egypt, we need to know more about their motivations and composition.  
Egypt has a far larger security apparatus (1.3 million139 versus 170.000140 security 
forces) and military (450.000141 compared to 140.000142 active members) than Algeria. The 
main security organization of Algeria is the Department of Intelligence and Security (DRS). 
Ghanem-Yazbeck calls the DRS “an all-powerful and feared force protecting the Algerian 
state” and this security apparatus fully supports the Algerian president.143 Moreover, the DRS 
is very experienced in fighting threats to the Algerian state, such as radical Islamists. Egypt’s 
prime security force is the Central Security Forces (CSF). Frish argues that the CSF was 
responsible for defending the Egyptian state.144 The CSF has been established “to intimidate 
the political opposition and silence public expressions of dissent.”145 The CSF had been 
successful repressing uprisings prior to the Arab Spring due to the fact that on those occasions, 
the CSF outnumbered protesters. The CSF is not as effective as the Algerian DRS, due to the 
fact that the conscripts of the CSF are under-trained, underpaid and unmotivated.  
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Sympathy for Islam has infiltrated the Egyptian army says Frish, “At least half of the 
army recruits, it must be assumed, are supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafis…” 
Moreover, the composition of the Egyptian army does not represent the different political 
segments of Egypt according to Frish,  “The Egyptian army hardly recruits Copt or the Sunni 
Egyptian upper class that equals roughly 20 percent of the population. The implications of 
such a recruitment pattern are that the secular and liberals are severely underrepresented in the 
army and the Islamists overrepresented.” Feldman argues that the Algerian army is more loyal 
to its regime compared to Egypt, because the Algerian military of Algeria is more intertwined 
with the Algerian government than is the case in Egypt.146 
The Algerian military is more intertwined with the political system compared to Egypt 
and it has been an important political actor since 1962.147 The army and the security apparatus 
are major stakeholders in the political system based on patronage and therefore they receive a 
large extent of the state’s income. The army and the security apparatus belong to “le pouvoir” 
(i.e., the elite that runs the country.148 
I conclude that although Egypt has more security capabilities than Algeria, but the 
Algerian security capabilities are trust worthier due to their loyalty to the regime. Based on 
this structural factor, the Algerian regime is more likely to survive uprisings compared to 
Egypt.  
 
New media 
Next I will analyze the level of penetration of new media (such as social media) and 
alternative media outlets. I argue that higher levels undermine regime stability, because new 
media is more difficult to control. The high level of penetration of new media and alternative 
media endangered Egyptian regime stability, while this was not the case in Algeria. 
 Mobile phones and the Internet were the core communication channels for 
revolutionary activity during the Arab uprisings. Al Jazeera was the most influential non-state 
actor during the uprisings, according to Hugh Miles, because protesters would film atrocities 
committed by their regime with their cellphones and upload the movie clips to the worldwide 
web.149 Al Jazeera would then pick up these images or videos and broadcast them by satellite 
television. Even when the Internet was cut off, citizens of the Arab world could receive 
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reporting of Al Jazeera by satellite television. The interaction between social media and 
satellite media proved to be dangerous to autocrats of the region, since it connected citizens 
across the region.  
The Egyptian government temporarily cut off the Internet and mobile networks on 
January 28th, 2011 in an attempt to contain the uprising.150 Prior to this black down, the 
government blocked Facebook and Twitter. Political activists used these channels to create 
awareness about the use of excessive violence by Egyptian police- and security forces.  
Egypt has had more than 473,000 Facebook users in 2011.151 That is the highest 
number of Facebook users in the whole Middle East and North Africa. The most visited 
websites in Egypt were Google, Facebook, YouTube and Twitter. Egypt had almost three 
times more citizens with access to the Internet compared to Algeria (31.4% and 12.5% 
respectively). 
In the summer of 2010 Egyptian detectives brutally killed Egyptian blogger Khaled 
Said.152 His family uploaded a horrific photo to the Internet of the beaten up face of Mr. Said. 
Soon “Google executive” Wael Ghonim stumbled upon the photo and he decided to create a 
Facebook page entitled We Are All Khaled Said.153 A third of Egypt’s Facebook users 
followed this Facebook page and thereby they received information about developments with 
regards to the prosecution of the police officers that killed Mr. Said. In a later stage the page 
was used to mobilize protesters, “it was that web site which first called for Egyptians to gather 
in protest on a day of anger on January 25.”154  
It is clear that new media and alternative media facilitated protesters to confront their 
incumbent autocrat. The penetration of these media was much higher in Egypt than in Algeria. 
Therefore, based on this structural factor, Egypt had a slightly better prospect for ousting its 
ruler compared to Algeria.  
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Timing of the uprisings 
Now I will evaluate the timing of the Egyptian and the Algerian uprisings respectively. The 
timing of uprisings affects regime stability. When uprisings take place within the electoral 
cycle or in close proximity to a national event, then these uprisings have a heightened chance 
to succeed. Especially when elections are fraudulent the probability for unrest increases.  
 In Egypt the uprisings did not coincide within the electoral cycle. The last 
Parliamentary elections before the Arab uprisings reached Egypt were held on November 28, 
2010.155 The Egyptian uprisings began almost a month later, on January 25, 2011, according 
to Gelvin.156 That day was a national holiday for Egyptians, the National Police Day. Several 
organizations, such as “We are all Khaled Said,” the April 6 Movement and individuals from 
political parties and labor unions called upon their fellow citizens to join demonstrations on 
January 25th, 2011. A second round of protests commenced on January 28, 2011.  
Shenker argues that while the Mubarak has committed electoral fraud during the 2010 
Parliamentary elections, this did not lead to major mobilization against the government. The 
Egyptian government interfered in the parliamentary elections of November 2010 using 
various methods, such as curtailing the mobilization of the opposition by setting in plain 
clothed security forces that had beaten up individuals belonging to the opposition; another 
method of the government is rejecting the opposition to partake in the monitoring the 
elections.157 
On November 30, 2010 the White House released an official statement saying that the 
US Government is unhappy about the circumstances in which the Egyptian parliamentary 
elections took place: “irregularities at the polls, the lack of international monitors and the 
many problems encountered by domestic monitors, and the restrictions on the basic freedoms 
of association, speech and press in the run-up to the elections are worrying.” 158 The 
Independent Coalition for Elections’ Observation, a coalition of Egyptian rights groups claim 
that the 2010 Egyptian parliamentary elections “were full of widespread violations that 
brought Egypt at least 15 years back.”159 
The Algerian uprisings did not coincide with the electoral cycle either. The most 
recent Algerian elections before the wake of the Arab Spring were the Presidential elections 
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held on April 9, 2009.160 While these elections were not independently monitored,161 the 
elections have been classified as “largely fair.”162 The National Coordination for Change and 
Democracy (CNCD), an umbrella of political activists, announced mass protests to be held on 
February 12, 2011 in the capital city Algiers. I argue that the timing of uprisings in Algeria 
was far weaker than that of Egypt. Egypt had chosen the national police day to commemorate 
gross human right violations by the police, symbolized by the murder on Khaled Said. That 
makes the Egyptian uprising more likely to succeed. 
To conclude these structural factors of regime stability (effectiveness and loyalty of 
the security apparatus and army; penetration of new and alternative media; and timing of an 
uprising) in the wake of uprisings, I argue that the structural composition of Algeria made it 
harder for Algerians to topple their leader compared to Egypt.  
 
Modular phenomena 
A few days after former Tunisian president Ben Ali fled his country, Hamzawy argued that 
the Tunisian experience would have important lessons for both governments and citizens of 
the Arab World, “Regimes should keep the lessons in mind to avoid repeating Tunisia’s 
experience in their own countries, while citizens can draw inspiration in hopes of effecting 
democratic change.”163  
That statement coincides with the logic of the modular diffusion of uprisings and 
illuminates two important processes. First, citizens could use prior successful uprisings as an 
example and as a source of valuable lessons for their own uprising. Second, the political elite 
could learn from uprisings that take place elsewhere and in turn they could design state 
policies accordingly.  
Elite defection model 
The elite defection model describes the case of Egypt the best. On January 28, 2011 the police 
forces withdrew from the site of protests because the interior minister disobeyed the order of 
President Hosni Mubarak to use live ammunition on protesters.164 The same day the army 
deployed at Tahrir Square and soon after it announced not to shoot at demonstrators. These 
events lowered the structural requirements for successful action in Egypt. 
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Elite learning 
The elite learning model describes the experiences of Algeria the best. The political elite of 
Egypt and Algeria sought to learn valuable lessons from the Tunisian uprisings. Elite learning 
in Algeria raised the structural requirements for successful action. The Egyptian security 
system was concerned with the possibility of a spillover of revolutionary activity from Tunisia 
to Egypt, due to the overthrow of Tunisian president Ben Ali, “we are obviously being very 
alert about possible demonstrations that could be prompted by any of these incidents. We are 
keeping our eyes wide open.”165 
 The political elite of Algeria was prepared for a spillover of demonstrations from its 
neighboring countries into Algeria: “for months now, Algerian authorities have been busy 
pre-empting a potential threat of revolution. The success of popular movements in 
neighboring Tunisia and Egypt sent alarming signals to government circles that Algeria was 
next in line to experience revolutionary change.”166  
The Algerian regime has combined repressive measurements with providing financial 
aid (derived from financial buffers due to oil resources) in order to prevent the outbreak of a 
revolution.167 In February 2011 security forces quickly circumvented an uprising. The regime 
gave even more financial resources to its population after protests occurred in order to weaken 
the opposition. Public spending for services like food subsidies, an increase of wages and 
providing loans to entrepreneurs doubled in the year 2010 and 2011.168  
When the uprisings reached Algeria, the Algerian government reacted to these protests 
with a mixture of the following acts: “ordering prices lowered, […] offering other economic 
and political concessions, and […] by displaying a considerable show of force.”169  
Learning by citizens 
The Tunisian Jasmine Revolution proved to be an example for Algerian and Egyptian citizens 
of what was possible to achieve. Gelvin argues that although the nature of protests and the 
goals varied across states of the Arab Spring, there have been examples of transnational 
learning and sharing of mobilization techniques and symbols.170  
 The founder of the April 6 movement (i.e., an influential organized group within the 
Egyptian opposition), Ahmed Maher, says that the organization was in contact with the 
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Tunisian youth by Facebook. The youths of Tunisia and Egypt taught each other ways to 
make their struggle against their respective autocratic ruler more efficient: the Tunisian 
activists shared information with the Egyptian youth on how to cope with armed vehicles; tear 
gas bombs; and with police cordons. Furthermore, the Tunisian activists recommended the 
April 6 Movement to start the demonstrations at night because by then the security forces 
would be very exhausted. Protesters from elsewhere (e.g., Libya) came to Egypt to seek 
advice from the April 6 Movement. The fact that Egyptians learned a great deal from Tunisian 
protesters furthered Egyptians prospect to successfully overthrow their authoritarian leader. 
No significant learning by citizens occurred in the case of Algeria. Therefore, the structural 
requirements for successful action in Algeria stayed constant. 
Course and outcome of uprisings in Egypt 
The April 6 Youth Movement was one of the key actors in the Egyptian uprisings of 2011.171 
The movement originated after a textile strike in Mahalla attended by 70.000 protesters in 
April 6, 2008. The April 6 movement formulated the following demands with regard to the 
2011 uprisings: Mubarak and his sons should not be allowed to run for the presidential 
elections; dissolve the National Assembly; disable the Emergence Laws; reform the 
constitution and the government; and all of these measurements need to be implemented 
directly.  
 Approximately ten thousand protesters managed to gather in Tahrir Square, the central 
square of Cairo on January 25, 2011. Uprisings also took place outside the capital city in 
places such as Alexandria, Suez, Asyut and even in the Sinai desert.172 In these places, Gelvin 
argues, demonstrations were “more violent” compared to those in Cairo.  
Pro-Mubarak forces appeared at Tahrir square on Wednesday morning February 2nd, 
2011,173 one day after Mubarak gave a public speech in which he told not to take part in future 
elections.174;175;176 That day President Hosni Mubarak unleashed “goons on horseback and 
camelback” as a last resort to stop the protests.177 Pro-Mubarak forces used live ammunition 
and other weapons, such as Molotov cocktails, to fight anti-Mubarak protesters, while the 
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army retreated.178 From the 8th of February many workers began to strike. On the 11th of 
February vice-president Suleiman declared that president Hosni Mubarak would step down 
and that the army would take control over the state.  
The recent Egyptian uprisings forced an end to the rule of former Egyptian president 
Hosni Mubarak. At this height of the revolution approximately 1 million Egyptians marched 
the street against president Mubarak. Many scholars and citizens alike hoped that the removal 
of Mubarak from power would allow Egypt to make a meaningful transition to democracy. It 
is too early to judge whether the uprisings are true revolutions or not. Initial reports on Egypt, 
indicate that both the Muslim brotherhood regime led by Morsi and the military regime led by 
Al-Sisi again showed autocratic tendencies.  
Egypt faced an extraordinary follow-up of events, amongst others: the overthrow of 
president Hosni Mubarak; followed by a transition period; then free elections took place in 
which Muslim Brotherhood leader Mohammed Morsi was elected and ruled for only 13 
months;179 followed by a bloody conflict between the army and anti-Morsi forces on the one 
hand and pro-Morsi forces on the other hand; then the army under leadership of general Abdul 
Fattah al-Sisi took control over the political system again.180  
A result of the Egyptian uprisings is that the Egyptian nation is no longer afraid of 
those ruling over them.181 Some argue that the military leadership is as much part of the 
Mubarak regime as former president Mubarak himself. The army behaved similar to the 
Mubarak era after the overthrow of president Mubarak. The army used live ammunition on 
protesters for example. The Egyptian army also murdered Copts that attended a peaceful 
protest.  
Nature and effects of the uprisings in Algeria 
Protests took place in Algeria in January and February 2011, says Gelvin.182 Algerians 
marched the streets because they were dissatisfied with rising prices of “basic staples” (e.g., 
food), “housing”, and “unemployment”, says Gelvin.183 Gelvin says Algerian demonstrators 
were outnumbered by police forces on that day as well as on an attempt a week later. This 
undermined the protestors to march. Although Algerians were unable to mobilize vast masses 
of demonstrators, such as those in neighboring Tunisia, “sporadic rioting” and strikes carried 
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on. Gelvin says that these riots were organized at the local level and “triggered by specific 
grievances.”  
Although major uprisings took place in January 2011, president Abdelaziz Boutefklika 
managed to stay in power. President Bouteflinka used a combination of  “political reforms 
and pay rises.”184 The state was “heading towards an explosion,” according to former 
Algerian Prime Minister Ahmed Benbitour. Algerian authorities believe that riots such as the 
ones that took place in 2011 will no longer controllable in the future. Furthermore, the 
government is unable to provide jobs to the annual draft of graduates coming from the 1.5 
million students enrolled in the university.  
Gelvin argues that the Algerian protests did force the government to make some 
changes, such as the restoration of subsidies on consumer goods, the lifting of the emergency 
law in all places except for the capital city. Furthermore, the Algerian government promised, 
“limited political reform.” 
Why did the Algerian protests of January and February 2011 not succeed? Gelvin 
summarizes several explanations from “observers”: “[…] effective repression; the 
inseparability of the military from the regime; the reluctance on the part of Algerians to revisit 
the horrors of civil war; Algeria’s two-decade-long hemorrhaging of young professionals, the 
very people who played a leading role in the Tunisian and Egyptian uprisings; divisions 
within the protest movement on everything from tactics to goals; the leading role in the 
CNDC played by a political party identified with an ethnic minority; the lack of support from 
labor on nonbread-and-butter demands; and the key role in the initial riots played by slum 
dwellers.”185  
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Conclusion  
I argued that Egypt was more prone for the emergence of uprisings that contested its political 
regime. The elite defection describes the events of Egypt during the Arab Spring the best. 
While elite learning occurred in the case of Algeria, raising the structural requirements for 
successful action. The most important structural factor for the outcome of uprisings was the 
loyalty and effectiveness of the security forces and army. When the Egyptian army disobeyed 
orders to use violence against protesters, the bar for successful action dropped. In Algeria, 
however, the military stayed loyal to the political elite and obeyed to its orders. 
The findings of this research might be applicable to other states in the MENA. The 
successful overthrow of the regime in Tunisia inspired citizens elsewhere in the region, such 
as in Egypt and Algeria, to step up against their suppressive and authoritarian regimes. The 
interconnectedness of uprisings was possible due to pan-Arabism, similar destinies and 
modern media outlets.  
Egyptians successfully ousted their repressive leader, resulting in an immediate 
turbulence of events. In the case of Algeria, the uprisings failed to bring results. These events 
are relevant for the entire region.  
The spread of uprisings and regime stability is not only relevant for political scientists, 
but also for those responsible for designing foreign policies. When Israeli policymakers for 
example conduct their foreign policy, they need to take into account the political situation of 
its neighbors. Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Egypt are dictatorships that have strong ties with the 
USA and they have a relative moderate stance against Israel.186 Israeli policymakers fear that 
these states will take a more hostile stance against Israel when their respective dictators are 
ousted.  
One implication of this thesis is that when investigating uprisings we cannot fully treat 
cases independent from each other, but we must accept that cases are, to some extent, 
interdependent. Further, a structural explanation for the presence or absence of a civil uprising 
should incorporate an assessment of diffusion mechanisms. Mechanisms of modular diffusion 
played a significant role in terms of the outcome of the uprisings in Egypt and Algeria. While 
structural requirements for a successful uprising dropped in Egypt as a consequence of elite 
defection, the Algerian case experienced elite learning, raising the threshold for successful 
action.  
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A limitation of the research is the exclusion of the case of the Islamic Republic of Iran. 
On June 23rd, 2009 the so-called Green Revolution, a “model for non-violent civil rights 
movements,” commenced in Iran. 187  The protests were stopped as a result of brutal 
repercussions by the government. I have chosen to exclude this case because it does not fit in 
the context of the Arab Spring. However, Iran does play a central role in the region for 
various reasons (e.g., the only Shiite-majority state; bad political relations with the West; the 
potential of becoming a regional hegemon), therefore I believe that incorporating the Iranian 
case will improve our understanding of the topics at hand. 
Another shortcoming of this research is that only two cases of the Arab Spring are 
investigated. In order to expand our knowledge on this topic we should enlarge the number of 
cases. New insights in the topic of this thesis could be gained by replicating this research with 
the cases Libya, Bahrain, Syria and Morocco. In these cases uprisings emerged, but led to 
different outcomes:  a regime-change took place in Libya, while uprisings in Bahrain, Syria 
and Morocco failed to oust the political leadership. Revolutions in Bahrain, Syria and Libya 
were influenced by foreign governments: the army of Saudi Arabian intervened in the 
Bahraini protests;188;189 Iran provided military assistance to president Assad; 190;191;192;193;194 
and the international community established a no-fly zone over Libya and used airstrikes to 
attack military targets.195  
The four extra cases can also be found in the MENA and these cases have similar 
structural factors. One such a similarity in structural factors is the longevity of the rule of the 
authoritarian leader: president Muammar Gaddafi has ruled Libya for 42 years;196 Bahrain has 
been ruled by prime minister Khalifa bin Salman Al Khalifa for 42 years and he is still in 
power;197 president Hafez al-Assad ruled Syria until his death in 2000 and his successor was 
his son Bashar al-Assad. The Assad family has thus held the Syrian presidency for over four 
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decades;198 and the Moroccan monarchy has been restored in 1956, ever since the monarchy 
ruled over Morocco.199  
Another similarity is that the political regimes of Libya, Syria and Bahrain used 
ruthless tactics of violence in order to suppress peaceful protests. In contrast to Libya, Syria, 
Bahrain, the Moroccan security forces under leadership of King Mohammad VI didn’t use 
“excessive violence” on peaceful demonstrators in 2011 and 2012.200  
A major actor in the Moroccan demonstrations was the February 20 movement that 
managed to mobilize tens of thousands of Moroccans to demonstrate for political and 
economic reform. In the run-up to February 20, 2011 the organization, described as “a popular, 
nationwide protest group, [that] has proven to be the most significant political change to occur 
in Morocco over the past year,”201 used social media to spread a video urging citizens to join 
peaceful demonstrations.202 King Mohammad VI promised a new constitution and thereby 
managed (for the time being) to prevent revolution, thus the Moroccan experience was nor a 
revolution, nor repression, but accommodation or a “third way.”203  
Another recommendation for future study are the protests of April 2014 that preceded 
the 2014 Algerian presidential elections. A group called Bakarat (translation: enough) led 
these protests. It would be insightful to analyze whether the reactions of the government to 
this opposition follow the model of modular democratic revolution. 
Only one type of diffusion, namely modular diffusion, has been be analyzed in this 
thesis. Other types of diffusion could potentially have a greater explanatory value. Moreover, 
it is important to investigate if other types of diffusion also interact with structural factors. 
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Appendix 
Name indicator:  
“GNI per capita, PPP (current international $)”  
Website:  
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.PP.CD 
Operationalization:  
“GNI per capita based on purchasing power parity (PPP). PPP GNI is gross national income 
(GNI) converted to international dollars using purchasing power parity rates. An international 
dollar has the same purchasing power over GNI as a U.S. dollar has in the United States. GNI 
is the sum of value added by all resident producers plus any product taxes (less subsidies) not 
included in the valuation of output plus net receipts of primary income (compensation of 
employees and property income) from abroad. Data are in current international dollars based 
on the 2011 ICP round.” 
 
Name indicator:  
“GDP (current US$)” 
Website:  
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD 
Operationalization:  
“GDP at purchaser's prices is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the 
economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the 
products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or 
for depletion and degradation of natural resources. Data are in current U.S. dollars. Dollar 
figures for GDP are converted from domestic currencies using single year official exchange 
rates. For a few countries where the official exchange rate does not reflect the rate effectively 
applied to actual foreign exchange transactions, an alternative conversion factor is used.” 
 
Name indicator:  
“Internet users (per 100 people)” 
Website: 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IT.NET.USER.P2?display=default 
Operationalization:  
“Internet users are people with access to the worldwide network.” 
 
Name indicator:  
“Electoral fraud” 
Operationalization:  
To assess whether the Algerian and Egyptian government conducted electoral fraud I have 
conducted short literature analyses on reports and articles regarding prior Algerian and 
Egyptian elections.  
 
Name indicator:  
“Size of armed forces and security forces” 
Operationalization:  
To measure the size of the army and security apparatus of Algeria and Egypt respectively I 
will look into both number of personnel and financial budget. I will look for this information 
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in international reports and literature. An army consists of land forces, air force and navy. The 
security apparatus refers to police forces, secret service members and others that represent 
national security. 
 
Name indicator:  
“Composition of military and security apparatus” 
Operationalization:  
To assess the nature, composition and history of the army and security apparatus of Algeria 
and Egypt respectively I will look into literature regarding the degree of institutionalism and 
kinship within these institutes. The security apparatus refers to police forces, secret service 
members and others that represent national security. 
 
	  
